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Abstract 
Economists are now familiar with “between” and “within” group inequality 
decompositions, for race, gender, spatial units, etc. But what exactly is the normative 
significance of the empirical results produced by these decompositions? This paper raises 
some basic questions about policy interpretations of decompositions that are found in the 
literature.
                                                           
* These notes are based on observations and comments at the World Bank’s ABCDE in April, 2002, and at 
the Cornell/LSE/Wider Conference on Spatial Inequality and Development, June 2002. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Consider n individuals and divide them into m mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
groups. Consider a variable y, which is thought to capture some aspect of wellbeing. Let 
µ be the mean and I an inequality index defined on y for a given population of 
individuals. Then, of course, µ and I can be calculated for each sub-group and for the 
total population. And as is well known, for the class of sub-group decomposable 
inequality measures, overall inequality can be written as the sum of a between group 
component and a within group component. Between group inequality is inequality 
calculated on the total population when each y in a group is replaced by the mean of y in 
that group. It reflects, therefore, the mean differences across the groups. Within group 
inequality is a weighted sum of the I’s calculated for each of the groups. It reflects the 
inequality that exists “over and above” mean difference across groups. 
 
 The above decomposition exercise is very familiar by now. The groups can be 
defined by space, race, or gender, for example. The variable y is usually real per capita 
household expenditure of the individuals in the population, although it could be assets 
like land holding, years of schooling, etc. The inequality indices used are usually 
members of the Generalized Entropy class of measures, which includes Theil’s first 
measure (in which case the within group component is an income share weighted sum of 
the Theil indices for each group) or Theil’s second measure (in which case the weights 
are population shares of the groups). Sometimes variance or log variance are used, which 
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permit analysis of variance interpretations of the decomposition, but other (unattractive) 
properties of these two indices stand as a caveat to their use as inequality measures. 
 
 Whichever decomposition is done, it turns out that empirically, for gender (two 
groups) and race (usually less than five groups), the between group component is less 
than 15 percent. For space, it depends on how disaggregated a grouping is possible. For 
example, for rural Peru, it requires going below Region, below Province, and below 
Canton to the Parroquia level (there are 915 of these units), for the between group 
component still to rise only to 15 per cent1. 
 
2. Normative Uses of Decomposition 
 
 There is no question that inequality decompositions are an effective tool in the 
positive analysis of inequality. They allow useful depictions of patterns that can be a first 
step in identifying the proximate causes of inequality. But such inequality 
decompositions, and related statistics, also tend sometimes to underpin policy analysis 
and normative arguments, and this is where great care is needed. 
 
 For example, it could be argued, and is sometimes implicitly argued, that because 
the between group component of inequality for race, space and gender groupings is low, 
policy should be less concerned about equalizing outcomes across these categories, 
focusing instead on factors that determine the within group component. On race, the 
conclusion would be that in Malaysia, for example, policies for achieving balance in 
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average outcomes across Chinese, Indians and Malays should receive less weight than 
policies that equalize (say) educational achievements since it is the latter that account for 
the within race component of inequality, and it is this component which is the dominant 
component of total inequality.2 A similar conclusion could be reached for gender in most 
developing countries.3 On space, the conclusion might be that in rural Madagascar, where 
the between group component at the Fivondrona level is 15 percent, policy should focus 
on inequalities within Fivondronas, through community development projects and the 
like, and less so on equalizing mean differences between these units.4 
 
 There is a related tendency in some policy oriented discourses that rely on group 
decompositions to argue as follows. If decomposition by grouping type A leads to a 
larger between group component than decomposition by grouping type B, then equalizing 
across grouping of type A should have the higher policy priority. For example, if the 
between group component of education inequality is greater for a spatial decomposition, 
or a wealth categories decomposition, than it is for gender decomposition, then 
equalization across the first two groups should receive greater priority.5 
 
 These policy stances seem to follow naturally from the decomposition 
methodology. The between group component of inequality tells us, in an accounting 
sense, what inequality would be if there were no mean differences between groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 See Elbers et. al. (2002). 
2 For an early discussion on decomposing inequality in Malaysia, see Anand (1983). 
3 For a discussion of this, see Kanbur (2003). 
4 Elbers et. al. (2002). 
5 There is also a technical question of the extent to which the number of groups in any given classification 
affects the between groups component. Clearly, if groups are subdivided into further subgroups, the 
between group component will increase for this reason alone. See Kanbur (2002). 
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Surely this leads to high priority for equalizing across groupings that show a high 
between group component? But there are at least four sets of issues to be addressed—the 
independent role of groups in normative and policy analysis, the possibility of changing 
groups, the possibility of sharing within groups, and the importance of being specific on 
policy instruments and their costs. 
 
3. The Significance of Groups 
 
The individualistic roots of the economic literature on the measurement of 
inequality run very deep. Even the term “interpersonal inequality” shows that the key 
focus is on the difference between individuals, and groupings of individuals have 
significance only in so far as individual outcomes are aggregated across the group, and 
group patterns have significance only as part of the overall picture of inequality between 
persons. Groups qua groups have no special significance in the normative calculus. But if 
individual identity flows in part from group membership this may help to explain why it 
is the ratio of the mean incomes of two racial groups that has socio-political salience, 
rather than the (low) proportion of overall interpersonal inequality accounted for by the 
between race term in a standard inequality decomposition. 
 
Another reason why groupings may have significance greater than their low 
between group contribution to inequality might suggest is that mean difference across 
certain types of groupings may be normatively unacceptable. For example, any income 
differences attributable only to race, or to gender, might be held to be abominable and 
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receive the highest priority, no matter what their contribution to overall interpersonal 
inequality. The social weight on these group differences might be far greater. 
 
The above arguments may be easily accepted for race or gender, but what about 
administrative spatial units? Of course if these have racial, ethnic or linguistic 
differences, the earlier argument applies, but it can then be said that there is nothing 
special about space here, the real issue being race or ethnicity. But even without these 
differences, administrative units may develop their own identity through design or 
through practice. In terms of design, federated structures often have explicit arrangements 
that emphasize “equal weight” of each unit, politically and symbolically, irrespective of 
any other characteristics such as their population size. Thus, for example, each State in 
the US supplies two Senators to the US Senate; certain taxation and expenditure powers 
are constitutionally decentralized in Ethiopia and India, etc. Thus spatial units may 
develop special identities even without the basis of ethnicity, race or religion. 
 
Such non-individualistic departures from the norm make economists 
uncomfortable, partly because it is a struggle to make sense of them in the framework of 
textbook economics. But there is increasing acceptance of the idea that social stability 
may well depend on these group characteristics, and the tools to think about such issues 
are now being developed.6 
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4. Changing Groups—Where Does Migration Fit In? 
 
Inequality decomposition is done with fixed groups. As discussed above, part of 
the significance of difference across gender and race is because people do not have a 
choice in the group to which they belong, and it is therefore argued that differences 
across such groups take on special significance. But of course there is one sense in which 
space is fundamentally different from race. An individual’s spatial location can be 
changed much more easily than her ethnicity or race.7 This is perhaps why economist’s 
intuitions lead them to “worry less” about spatial inequality than about racial inequality 
(even though the percentage of total inequality that these two explain is around the same). 
Now if spatial migration were genuinely free, then it would continue until all spatial 
disparities in real incomes were removed. Indeed, in the new economic geography 
models equilibrium is pinned down precisely by the equality of real wages of the 
(identical workers) in the different regions.8 There is thus geographic concentration, but 
no real income inequality in these equilibria.  
 
In reality, of course, migration is far from free. There are policy barriers to the 
movement of people, and adjustment to real income differentials may be slow.9 This is all 
very well, but to my mind the really interesting theoretical question is--could real income 
(ie utility) differentials persist without restrictions on migration? On the face of it this 
seems impossible in our standard models. Consider two individuals in two locations, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
7 This is not the place to get into the large literature on the evolution of ethnicity as a social construct. 
Suffice it to say that it is easier for a person of Chinese ethnicity in Malaysia to migrate to another town 
than to change ethnicity and become Malay—at least within a lifetime. 
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identical in every respect except that one has a higher utility level. Surely the one with 
the lower utility will move to take advantage of the conditions in the other place. But 
suppose now that each individual also has location specific human capital (social 
networks etc). Then we can have a situation where, comparing the two situations, neither 
individual wants to move, and one individual has higher utility than the other. The loss of 
location specific capital is what keeps each individual rationally in each place, and allows 
real income differences to persist. Some innovative modeling is called for here. 
 
One exercise that might seem to come close to the above in spirit is Ravallion’s 
(2002) identification of geographical externalities in rural China. He shows that (growth 
in) a household’s wellbeing depends not only on that household’s characteristics but also 
on the characteristics of the geographic region the household lives in. This does not, 
however, ensure that real income differences will persist, since in the logic of the model a 
household that migrates to another region has automatic access to (“takes on”) the other 
region’s characteristics. But what is needed for differentials to persist is that when a 
household moves it suffers, for some time, from a mismatch between the characteristics 
of the region it came from and the region it migrates to—a feature that is most strongly 
motivated, perhaps, for social networks. In order to test this we would have to have data 
on households or individuals who have moved recently. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 See Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). 
9 On official barriers to migration in China see Kanbur and Zhang (1999) and Au and Henderson (2002). 
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5. Sharing Within Groups 
 
 Continuing to stay with the individualistic tilt of the inequality measurement 
literature, let us stick with the assumption that what matters is individual real 
consumption. One reason why the 10-15 percent figure for between group inequality so 
goes against the basic ground level intuition that group means matter a lot to people, 
could be that there is more sharing within groups than is recorded in our household 
survey data. Thus the “within group” component as calculated from standard data is an 
overestimate, and between group inequality matters more than the 10-15 percent figure 
might suggest.  
 
Household surveys have become progressively better at capturing sharing through 
interpersonal transfers, but they are some way from giving us a fully accurate picture of 
the benefits that individuals get from local public goods such as safety, security, 
sanitation, and even schools and health posts. Local institutions such as temples and 
mosques provide tangible and intangible public goods that are missed in our surveys. It 
could be this that leads to parochialism that is often commented on—a poor member of a 
community (suitably defined), would rather that an additional dollar went to a rich 
member of his or her community than that it went to a poor person of another 
community. There is no empirical work on this, of course, but such tensions between 
class and community solidarity, which we would all acknowledge, would make less sense 
in a world in which sharing within groups was not important.10 
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6. Policy Based Approaches 
 
 Ultimately, the inequality measurement tradition is interested in policy. Hence the 
jump, by some, from the observation that the contribution of spatial, or racial, inequality 
to total inequality is “small”, to the policy conclusion that therefore policies to equalize 
group means across spatial or racial units are to have lower priority than other policies 
that would more vigorously attack the “within group” disparities (education is the 
favorite candidate here). But, in fact, this leap is not warranted without a closer 
examination of the patterns of inequality, the policy instruments to hand, their impacts, 
and their costs. 
 
 The key is to specify the policy instruments and work from there. Suppose we 
identify two classes of instruments—those that, broadly speaking, affect the group means 
and those that affect within group distributions (of course in practice there will not be 
quite such a clean division). Among the former could be differential budgetary allocation 
for infrastructure projects. Among the latter could be specific community development 
projects that reduce inequality within each group. The fact that the between group 
component of inequality is small might suggest that it is the latter that should be given 
priority. But it is easy to show that the analysis needs to be subtler than this. First of all, it 
can be that within group inequality is quite low for quiet a large number of the spatial 
units.11 So there should in fact be targeting of the community development efforts at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 For a theoretical analysis, see Dasgupta and Kanbur (2002). 
11 This is shown by Elbers et.al. (2002). 
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those units where within group inequality is particularly high (if the objective is to reduce 
inequality), or of group transfers to communities where within group inequality is quite 
low (if there are concerns about elite capture within communities). Thus the real question 
is which of the two policy instruments will have a bigger impact on inequality per dollar 
of public expenditure. And the answer to this question is not clear a priori since, among 
other things, we do not know what the costs of each instrument are, and we have not 
specified the precise modalities through which they will have an effect on inequality 
between and within groups respectively.12 
 
 As mentioned earlier, another type of policy leap that is sometimes made is as 
follows. Grouping a population into, say, ten categories of education gives rise to a much 
bigger between group component than grouping them into, say, gender groups, racial 
groups, or spatial groups. Thus, it is implicitly argued, equalization across the ten 
categories of education will give a bigger “bang” than any of the other instruments. But 
this again falls foul of lack of specificity of policy instrument. What exactly is being 
proposed in each case? What are its costs?13 What are its specific impacts on the 
distribution of income between and within groups? Without answers to these questions, 
implicitly pronouncing on policy instruments by looking at various between and within 
group decompositions is inappropriate.14 
 
 
                                                           
12 The same applies to poverty, and this relates closely to the large literature on poverty targeting. 
13 Thus the number of categories across which the mean differences are to be removed could be a 
determinant of the cost side of the story, whereas, as noted earlier, continual subdivision of groups into 
subgroups will surely increase the between group of component by definition. 
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7. Conclusion: Some Interesting Research Topics 
 
 The object of these notes has been to raise a number of questions on the uses of 
inequality decompositions in policy analysis. The discussion suggests a number of 
avenues for further research: 
 
1. Mathematical characterizations of the behavior of the between group component 
of inequality as the number of groups increases. 
2. Philosophical characterizations of why group mean difference might matter more 
than just their contribution to the between group component of total interpersonal 
inequality. 
3. Models of migration where real income differentials persist as equilibrium 
phenomena. 
4. Models of unmeasured sharing through local public goods, and its impact on the 
disconnect between real and measured inequality; empirical work to better 
measure the benefits of group specific public goods. 
5. Between and within group analysis of the impact of different instruments, and 
comparing the costs of alternative instruments to their benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 This point is also emphasized in a different context in Kanbur, 2003. 
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